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Visions of Greater Serbia: Local Dynamics and the Prijedor Genocide
  Damir Kovačević
University of Wisconsin
Eau Claire, Wisconsin, USA
When the academic community, media, or policy experts mention the Bosnian genocide, it is 
unclear what they are referring to. Their reference to the event is often twofold. First, the term 
focuses on the macro-level, failing to disaggregate the intensity, location, and timing of violence. In 
other words, the term is used unwittingly to lump various events into a single, coherent story. The 
problem is that by lumping events into a unified story, the idiosyncrasies that define the various 
localities are lost in exchange for a simplified understanding of a rather complex and dynamic 
phenomenon. Second, the term is commonly used in reference to the atrocities committed in 
Srebrenica. Though this event is noteworthy and stands as the quintessential example of the type 
of violence the international community vowed would never again happen, it does not give a full 
account of what occurred during the war. 
By taking a closer look at the meso-level, we see that the genocide in Bosnia was a coordinated 
campaign that extended across numerous municipalities, varying in time of execution and severity. 
The meso-level is a tool that studies violence at an analytical level below the nation-state.1 Aside 
from offering insights into subnational regions and localities, the meso-level is also “the least 
developed among the three prongs of genocide research.”2 For the purposes of this paper, I utilize 
the meso-level to investigate the episode of genocide that unfolded in the municipality of Prijedor 
in the spring and summer of 1992.3 The case of Prijedor is important for several reasons. First, 
Prijedor accounted for the most deaths in northwestern Bosnia, and the third most deaths out 
of any municipality during the war.4 Second, Prijedor was situated in the strategically important 
location known as the Serbian Arc, where the Bosnian Serbs sought to link the Bosnian Serb 
populations of Serbia proper, eastern Bosnia, northwestern Bosnia, and Croatia, under the Greater 
Serbia umbrella.5 Third, Prijedor accounted for a total of twenty-eight concentration camps – a 
significantly high number that included the notorious camps of Keraterm and Omarska.6 
I argue that structural control and agent collaboration highlight the factors that contributed 
to the escalation and radicalization of violence to genocide in Prijedor. This causal argument 
1 Charles King, “The Micropolitics of Social Violence,” World Politics 56, no. 1 (2004), 431-455, accessed March 27, 2019, 
https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2004.0016.
2 Evgeny Finkel and Scott Straus, “Macro, Meso, and Micro Research on Genocide: Gains, Shortcomings, and Future 
Areas of Inquiry,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 7, no. 1 (2012), 59, accessed February 
1, 2019, https://doi/.org/10.3138/gsp.7.1.56. Although this analytical level is underdeveloped, crucial research 
relating to genocide in Rwanda and civil war violence in Bosnia has been conducted. On the importance of local 
elites in the Bosnian civil war, see Fotini Christia, “Following the Money: Muslims versus Muslims in Bosnia’s 
Civil War,” Comparative Politics 40, no. 4 (2008), 461-480, accessed March 25, 2019, https://doi.org/10.5129/00104150
8X12911362383390. On the patterns of mass violence in Eastern Bosnia, see Edina Bećirević, Genocide on the Drina River 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014). On subnational violence and genocide in Rwanda, see Lee Ann Fujii, 
Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009); Scott Straus, The Order of 
Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).
3 It is important to note that there have been many prosecutions for crimes committed in Prijedor by the ICTY, most 
notably the cases of Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, but the court has deemed these crimes short of genocide. In 
fact, from an international legal perspective, only the case of Srebrenica was deemed genocide.
4 Patrick Ball et al., The Bosnian Book of the Dead: Assessment of the Database (Full Report) (Falmer, United Kingdom: The 
Institute of Development Studies, 2007), accessed March 27, 2019, http://www.hicn.org/wordpress/wp-content/
uploads/2012/07/rdn5.pdf.
5 Guido Acquaviva, “Robert Donia, From the Republika Srpska Assembly 1991-1996: Excerpts from Delegates’ Speeches at 
the Republika Srpska Assembly as Body of Evidence for the International Criminal Tribunal at The Hague,” Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 11, no. 1 (September 2013), 931-951, accessed March 25, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/
mqt049.
6 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), The Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 780, December 28, 1994 (UN Doc. S/1994/674/Annex VIII, Prison Camps), 22; 185-267. The report 
lists 36 total camps, but only 28 that can be corroborated. It is also important to note that there were vast differences 
between concentration camps. Some were larger in size, whereas others were garages and smaller spaces. Pages 185-
267 of the report include a more detailed account of the concentration camps.
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emphasizes why Bosnian Serb elites – national, local, military, and paramilitary – were able to 
achieve the goals of Greater Serbia by combining their efforts through effective political and 
territorial dominance of Prijedor. This theoretical contribution is critical for several reasons. First, 
it builds on the existing literature in the strategic and ideological paradigms proposed by second-
generation genocide scholars. However, it deviates on causal grounds. War (as proposed by the 
strategic paradigm) and exclusionary ideology are important to the story, but not as explanatory 
variables. War and exclusionary ideology set the stage for which cases are more likely to intensify, 
but to explain how and why violence ultimately escalates to genocide, we need to consider the 
dynamic relationship between structural factors and agents. Second, it suggests that previously 
established causal mechanisms pertinent to the national level may not apply to the local level. 
Thus, I intend to highlight how political authority, territorial bases, and the participation of local 
elites, are more suitable for explaining genocide at the subnational level.
Genocide: A Multi-Dimensional Conceptualization 
Genocide has attracted considerable scholarly attention across the humanities, legal studies, 
and social sciences. Unpacking the various conceptual disagreements is beyond the focus of this 
paper, but it is an area that deserves development, if scholars want to speak to each other across 
and within disciplines.7 For this paper, I employ Scott Straus’ definition of genocide. Genocide 
is “large-scale, organized, group-destructive violence that targets a specific social group in a 
territory.”8 This definition distinguishes genocide from other forms of political violence based on 
two characteristics: group-selectivity and group-destructiveness.9
Moreover, I conceptualize genocide as part of a multi-dimensional political violence 
framework where different tiers of intensity and group-targeting are possible. The purpose of such 
a dimension is to illustrate that genocide is a process of violence that perpetrators may escalate to 
over time. It can occur in the early stages of violence, later into the fighting, and in some instances, 
we may even see a de-escalation of violence. By understanding genocide as a process, we can move 
beyond the notion that it is a fixed event, or an isolated incident that can be studied independently 
of the greater political violence context. Perpetrators have an array of strategies in the political 
violence process, and my goal is to understand how and why the most extreme strategy unfolds. 
One dimension of the political violence framework includes the level of intensity. Limited violence 
represents the lowest level of intensity, while a full-scale war represents the highest level of 
intensity. The second dimension includes levels of group-targeting. In cases where groups are not 
targeted, we should see regular, combatant-targeted violence ranging in levels of intensity, while 
cases of group-targeting should range anywhere from discriminatory and exclusionary social 
policies directed at a specific group to mass killings or genocide.
7 For an interdisciplinary review of genocide, see: Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses, The Oxford Handbook of Genocide 
Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
8 Scott Straus, “Retreating from the Brink: Theorizing Mass Violence and the Dynamics of Restraint,” Perspectives on 
Politics 10, no. 2 (2012), 345, accessed March 25, 2019,  https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592712000709.
9 Scott Straus, who has pioneered the study of subnational variation in genocide studies identifies genocide along the lines 
of group-selectivity and group-destructiveness. For further reading, see Scott Straus, Making and Unmaking Nations: 
War Leadership, and Genocide in Modern Africa (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2015), 20-24.
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Figure 1. Political Violence Framework
This framework establishes four quadrants applicable to the universe of political violence 
cases. For this paper, I am specifically interested in Quadrant C. I focus on why the case of Prijedor 
was not Quadrant D violence, like the siege of Sarajevo, for instance, which represents a case of 
civil war violence between combatant groups.10 Relatedly, I focus on the factors that account for 
escalation and radicalization of violence in Prijedor, whereby the perpetrators engaged in high-
intensity violence, but rather than confining their violence to the traditional theater of warfare, they 
committed genocide against an ethno-religious group.11
Strategy, Ideology, and Shortcomings
The development of genocide literature within the discipline of political science has evolved from 
traditional explanations focusing on ancient hatreds, authoritarian regimes, and scapegoating, to 
the dominant camps centered on the strategic and ideological paradigm.12 The strategic paradigm 
views policies of genocide and mass violence developing in response to real or perceived threats 
and generally occurring during times of internal instability or warfare.13 Benjamin Valentino 
10 UNSC, The Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, December 28, 
1994 (UN Doc. S/1994/674/Annex V, The Prijedor Report), 101.
11 For other helpful frameworks, see Anthony W. Marx, “The Nation-State and Its Exclusions,” Political Science Quarterly 
17, no. 1 (2002), 103-126, accessed March 27, 2019, https://doi.org/10.2307/798096; and Straus, Retreating from the Brink, 
343-362, accessed March 25, 2019,  https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592712000709.
Marx examines cases of exclusionary nationalism but leaves out “ultimate exclusion” or genocide from his framework 
and argues it deserves a distinct analysis. Straus provides a “Ladder of Violence,” which shows the factors of 
escalation and restraint. Leaders can move down the ladder and increase levels of violence or move up the ladder and 
decrease levels of violence.
12 For first-generation research on intergroup prejudices and divisions, see Helen Fein, Accounting for Genocide: National 
Responses and Jewish Victimization during the Holocaust (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1979); Leo Kuper, Genocide: 
Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). For first-generation literature 
on authoritarian regimes, see Irving Louis Horowitz, Genocide: State Power and Mass Murder (New Brunswick: 
Transaction, 1976). For first-generation literature on scapegoating, see Ervin Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of 
Genocide and Other Group Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
13 Barbara Harff, “No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder 
since 1955,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003), 57-73, accessed March 27, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1017/
Kovačević
©2020     Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, no. 1  https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.1.1686
108
posits that genocide is more likely to occur during war because of the uncertainty and threats 
perceived by elites. Therefore, elites – both military and political – are critical for organizing mass 
violence because of their own beliefs, fears, hatreds, or interests, and are driven by instrumental, 
strategic calculations in pursuit of their goals.14 Manus Midlarsky argues that elites will perpetrate 
genocide in the context of loss, especially territorial. The presence of war leads to instability and 
vulnerability amongst groups, and when these groups suffer losses during wartime, they are more 
likely to engage in “imprudent realpolitik” by framing civilian groups as enemies and threats. 
Thus, the strategic paradigm draws several conclusions linking war to genocide: war creates threat 
and uncertainty, and threat and uncertainty increase the likelihood that violence will be used in 
response. Also, war increases the likelihood that members of the opposing group will be labeled 
as enemies, which will prompt the use of military violence against the perceived or real enemy.15
On the other hand, scholars situated within the ideological paradigm argue that to understand 
genocide, one needs to understand the ideologies that manifest in the thought process of elites. Elites 
possess certain ideological visions that constitute a legitimate form of the state. Certain groups fit 
this standard, while other groups pose a threat to the purity or utopia of an ethnically or religiously 
homogeneous society. Jacques Sémelin posits that leaders seek to exterminate social groups from 
certain territories to purify their own group and society. To accomplish this, elites will seek to unify 
in-groups to create fear and hostility toward out-groups, or enemies. By stressing unity, efforts to 
create purity lead to desires to eliminate these out-groups.16 Eric Weitz argues that leaders have 
grand ideological quests for utopian societies based on common group characteristics. The leaders 
see themselves as revolutionaries seeking a better future based on extreme exclusionary policies.17 
These themes are also present in Ben Kiernan’s historical account of genocide from ancient Sparta 
to modern-day Darfur. Kiernan establishes four salient features and patterns that are present in 
nearly every case of mass violence: cults of antiquity, agrarianism, racism or religious prejudice, 
and territorial expansion.18
So, what is missing? What is it about ideology and strategy that fails to explain the onset and 
process of genocide? For one, both include explanatory variables that occur more often than genocide. 
Although the strategic paradigm has made significant strides in emphasizing the importance of 
warfare as the backdrop for genocide, wars are still more common than genocide. How do we 
account for the non-cases of genocide that had similar patterns of warfare present? Additionally, 
the strategic paradigm fails to address two other important questions: Why are civilian groups 
targeted and why is the goal to eradicate these groups from the specific territory?19 The ideological 
paradigm seems to answer these questions partially. Civilian groups are targeted because they are 
seen as part of an illegitimate out-group, threatening the existence of the in-group and prospects 
for a homogenized society. However, just like the presence of warfare, extreme ideologies are also 
more common than genocide. What about those cases where elites possess extreme notions of in-
group and out-group dynamics but do not or cannot initiate genocidal violence? 
S0003055403000522; Matthew Krain, “State-Sponsored Mass Murder: The Onset and Severity of Genocides and 
Politicides,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 3 (1997), 331-360, accessed March 27, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1177%
2F0022002797041003001; Manus Midlarsky, The Killing Trip: Genocide in the Twentieth Century (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005); Martin Shaw, War and Genocide: Organized Killing in Modern Society (Cambridge: Polity, 
2003); Jay Ulfelder and Benjamin Valentino, Assessing Risks of State-Sponsored Mass Killing (Washington, DC: Political 
Instability Task Force, 2008), accessed March 27, 2019, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1703426. 
14 Benjamin Valentino, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2004).
15 Scott Straus, “Destroy Them to Save Us: Theories of Genocide and the Logics of Political Violence,” Terrorism and 
Political Violence 24, no. 4 (2012), 547-548, accessed March 27, 2019, https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1080/09546553.2012.
700611. 
16 Jacques Sémelin, Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide (London: Hurst & Company, 2005), 91.
17 Eric Weitz, A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 14.
18 Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2009).
19 Straus, Destroy Them to Save Us, 547.
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It is likely, as Straus argues, that these paradigms should complement one another in seeking 
to explain genocide.20 Although I do not disagree that these paradigms do a better job explaining 
such a rare event together rather than independently, I argue that they do not present the causal 
mechanisms for explaining how and why genocide was executed completely. To do this, I turn to 
the discussion of the meso-level before presenting two additional factors, structural control and 
agent collaboration, in explaining the escalation and radicalization to genocide.
Meso-Level Analysis 
The aforementioned literature almost exclusively focuses on the national level of analysis to 
explain genocide. A common theme is to select major twentieth-century cases and compare them. 
Although this has increased our empirical and theoretical understandings of this dynamic type 
of violence, it has also led to what Barbara Geddes refers to as “the selection bias in comparative 
politics.”21 By selecting on the dependent variable, scholars are justifying their case selection 
strategies on cases that share a common outcome, rather than common features that may have led 
to differing outcomes. One way to remedy this is to study negative cases, a solution proposed to 
scholars working in the comparative genocide literature.22 By studying the non-cases of genocide, 
scholars can determine which conditions are more likely to lead to genocide through careful, and 
methodologically strong, controlled-comparisons. 
Another issue that arises is the neglect of the local level. Referring to an event as the Armenian, 
Bosnian, or Rwandan genocide does not account for variation within those specific cases. Where 
in Bosnia did genocide occur? What was the timing and severity of the violence in a specific 
municipality? What local actors played a crucial role? How did they interact with national actors 
and various state institutions to carry out this violence? To answer these questions, another strategy, 
as argued on the onset of this paper, is to narrow the focus to a more intimate level of analysis. 
Therefore, a subnational analysis serves as another remedy. As argued by Charles King, 
episodes of social violence, whether riots or atrocities committed during civil wars, may well 
be patterned, but they do not occur uniformly across time or space. There are lulls and peaks. 
Violence comes to different cities, towns, and neighborhoods at different times. It plays out 
differently in various social contexts, even with a series of violent events that are lumped 
together as a single ethnic conflict or civil war.23
Rather than simply referring to the violence in Bosnia as the Bosnian genocide or equating it with 
the event at Srebrenica, I seek to examine the episode of Prijedor to better understand how and 
why violence escalated. Particularly, I want to know why violence reached high-levels of intensity 
and group-targeting, making Prijedor one of the deadliest municipalities during the war, with a 
significantly high number of concentration camps. By doing so, national level factors – government 
institutions, national leaders, and presence of internal instability and war – remain constant, and 
the importance of locality, and particularly the role of local elites can be examined. By bringing in 
the role of local elites and how they interact with national elites and institutions, we can begin to 
understand the phenomenon of genocide more holistically.
Scholars working in the tradition of political violence have employed such a technique to 
gain new empirical and theoretical insights into civil war violence, intercommunal rioting, and 
genocide.24 My goal is to use a similar methodological technique to gain additional empirical and 
20 Straus, Making and Unmaking Nations, 55-59; Straus, Destroy Them to Save Us, 549-550.
21 Barbara Geddes, “How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics,” 
Political Analysis 2, no. 1 (1990), 131-150, accessed March 27, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/2.1.131. 
22 Finkel and Straus, Macro, Meso, and Micro Research on Genocide, 63; Straus, Destroy Them to Save Us, 555; Ernesto Verdeja, 
“On Situating the Study of Genocide within Political Violence,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 
7, no. 1 (2012), 83-84, accessed March 25, 2019, https://doi.org/10.3138/gsp.7.1.81.
23 King, The Micropolitics of Social Violence, 447.
24 Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); 
Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Straus, The Order of 
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theoretical insights into an underdeveloped case. Although my analysis is a single-case study, I 
propose that the “micro-political turn,” to quote King, allows me to account for causal mechanisms 
missing when simply looking at the national level. This preliminary theoretical exploration can 
serve as a step for future comparative subnational analyses across other municipalities in Bosnia, 
and even other countries and regions.25
Argument
Before delving into the argument, it is important to emphasize the role the ideological and strategic 
paradigms have in explaining the phenomenon of genocide. Their complementary nature is a step 
forward, not as explanatory variables, but rather as scope conditions. As scope conditions, both the 
strategic and ideological paradigms specify the parameters to which the causal argument applies. 
In other words, by identifying cases of internal instability and/or war, whereby elites exhibit 
exclusionary ideologies of in-group and out-group dynamics, researchers can establish a proper 
universe of “at-risk” cases. These cases should be alarming and should signal to the researcher or 
policymaker that certain conditions are in place for what could be a future case of genocide.
Wars favor genocide because they justify killings as a policy. The perpetrators of the violence 
see out-groups as enemies, leading to fear and uncertainty, and ultimately a legitimization to use 
violence to eliminate the perceived or real threat. The empirical reality confirms this: genocide 
most always exists in the context of warfare.26 That being said, the presence of war still greatly 
exceeds the presence of genocide. War does not effectively explain cases under similar conditions 
that never led to genocide. 
Additionally, exclusionary ideology is the “totalizing system of meaning based on pronounced 
in-group and out-group distinctions permitting no shared forms of identification between groups 
and premised on a radical devaluation of the out-group.”27 The dangers of elites harboring 
exclusionary ideologies are twofold. First, these ideologies create immense divides between 
different social groups. The in-group is seen as a legitimate part of the envisioned state and the 
out-group is seen as illegitimate. Second, exclusivist ideologies seek to target and dehumanize out-
groups through various methods ranging from discrimination to forced assimilation or expulsion. 
As Verdeja notes, exclusivist ideology “achieves its greatest resonance when it exaggerates, and 
perverts already recognized differences between groups.”28 But if elites harbor exclusionary and 
fanatical ideas, and wish to act on these, what allows them to achieve their goals of eliminating the 
out-group? And if the presence of war overdetermines genocide, what other factors are necessary 
to explain a rare, but extraordinary phenomenon? 
To build on these scope conditions, I posit that the presence of structural control and agent 
collaboration help us understand which “at-risk” cases could spiral into genocidal violence. 
Structural control refers to adequate political authority and territorial bases. Adequate political 
authority may include effective political institutions, weak state capacity, total collapse of an 
effective central government, and support from neighboring states or other international allies 
to mobilize against possible suppression from the state.29 If elites within a group are the main 
perpetrator of the violence, then we should expect them to establish effective political institutions 
that rival the state or are in place of a failing or failed state government. The group may also be 
supported by a nearby ally that offers military power and resources to thwart the current regime. 
Genocide; Fujii, Killing Neighbors.
25 For other relevant readings on the Former Yugoslavia, see Nina Caspersen, Contested Nationalism: Serb Elite Rivalry in 
Croatia and Bosnia in the 1990s (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010); Dennis Gratz, “Elitocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Its Impact on the Contemporary Understanding of the Crime of Genocide,” The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity 
39, no. 3 (2011), 409-424; Adis Maksić, Ethnic Mobilization, Violence, and the Politics of Affect: The Serb Democratic Party 
and the Bosnian War (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
26 Harff, No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust?. In her quantitative analysis, Harff finds that out of 37 cases of genocide 
between 1955 to 1998, “all but one occurred during or immediately after political upheaval.”
27 Verdeja, The Political Science of Genocide, 315.
28 Ibid.
29 Stuart Kaufman, “Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence,” International 
Security 30, no. 4 (2006), 53, accessed March 27, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2006.30.4.45. 
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If the state is the main perpetrator of violence, then we should expect a lack of effective opposition 
since the state is already in power and more dominant than any potential opposing group. In this 
case, the state will have control of political institutions and might also be supported by neighboring 
states. By perpetrating the violence, we would expect a functioning central government capable of 
exerting force against targeted groups with little to no resistance.  
Elites within a groups must also have territorial bases to effectively mobilize, whether within 
the state or in a neighboring country.30 Again, if the state is the main perpetrator of the violence, 
then it will not have an issue with establishing territorial bases since the state’s entire territory 
should be the base. But for elites in groups seeking to perpetrate violence, it is crucial that they 
have effective military positions to mobilize personnel and escalate their violence against the out-
group.
Thus, structural control – political authority and territorial base(s) – increases the likelihood 
that wars will escalate to genocide. If elites do not possess effective political authority and territorial 
bases, they will most likely be in several disadvantageous positions. It could be that the group or 
state is overpowered and their goals of executing more extreme violence are upended. It could 
also be that the group or state is in a two-sided combatant battle, which would be a civil or ethnic 
war. In such an instance, genocide is unlikely to occur since the perpetrators must allocate their 
personnel and resources for fighting an effective resistance. Thus, for genocide to be executed, the 
perpetrators need unmatched, one-sided political authority and territorial control.  
But how much structural control is necessary for genocide to occur? In Kalyvas’ seminal 
work on civil war violence, he argues that “selective violence can only take place in those areas 
where control is complete enough for denouncers to denounce, but not so complete that defectors 
have either fled or simply ceased to be of concern to the political actor.”31 In other words, Kalyvas 
argues that we should expect civil war violence under areas of dominant control.32 Establishing 
dominant control in civil wars is useful for two reasons: First, civil wars are armed conflicts 
between groups within a state. The actors involved, as noted by Kalyvas, may involve combatants 
and noncombatants. However, the main purpose of the violence is not the physical extermination 
of a group from a specified territory, but rather their compliance. Second, in civil wars, the actors 
– incumbents or insurgents – who have dominant control have already placed the target group 
under their authority. Their goals have been effectively met and the escalation of violence is less 
likely to occur. 
In genocide, the presence of dominant control is not enough. To escalate and radicalize violence, 
perpetrators need to establish complete control. If perpetrators seek to physically exterminate an 
out-group from a specified territory, then they will need to display more control than needed in civil 
wars to achieve their goals. Unlike civil wars, placing the out-group under your authority does not 
achieve the goals in mind. The goal is purity, a utopian society that can rid itself of an illegitimate 
group altogether, and complete control increases the likelihood of exclusionary ideologies coming 
to fruition. 
Kalyvas argues that violence during civil wars may be perpetrated under instances of 
complete control if rival actors are engaged in indiscriminate rather than selective violence. I argue 
that complete control is also more likely when perpetrators engage in extreme selective violence, 
or genocide.33 What makes genocide selective is not the private information actors receive about 
individuals, the basis for civil war violence, but rather two important factors: the identification 
30 Monica Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and Indivisibility of Territory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2003), 18-19.
31 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 209.
32 Ibid., 196-197. Kalyvas outlines Zones of Control. Zone 1 represents full control by the incumbents, while Zone 5 
represents full control by the insurgents. Zone 3 represents a state of parity, while Zones 2 and 4 represent dominant 
control by the incumbents and insurgents, respectively. 
33 Ibid., 209. Kalyvas’ argument centers on civil war violence, thus, he differentiates indiscriminate violence from selective 
violence. Actors are more likely to rely on indiscriminate violence when resources and information are unavailable, 
whereas those actors participating in selective violence have received the necessary information needed. My 
argument centers on genocide, which is a more extreme form of violence than civil wars, but nonetheless, selective. 
The perpetrators of genocide identify target groups and members within those target groups for extermination. This 
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of members belonging to the out-group based on ethnic, national, racial, or religious differences 
and the identification of individuals within those groups – often community leaders and men of 
military age – who perpetrators especially want to eliminate due to their prestigious or threatening 
status. 
Likewise, agent collaboration is equally important for violence to escalate to genocide. 
Genocide is a radical and cumulative process, so it is crucial to understand the behavior and 
policies of agents at different levels of the state. The types of agents include key decision-makers 
in positions of power, such as national elites, local elites, the military, paramilitary groups, and so 
on. Everyday civilians can and do certainly participate, but such a systematic event cannot occur 
without effective leadership. Thus, national elites are important because genocide is destructive, 
organized, and sustained violence over a particular territory that requires the participation of 
various actors and institutions.34 The state or group must have considerable administrative force 
to execute systematic massacres across a country or region. Additionally, national elites often 
implement strategic goals they wish to achieve. By outlining clear objectives, national elites are 
at the top of the chain of command and their orders are directed down to military commanders, 
paramilitary groups, police forces, and local civilian leadership across the country or region. 
Because genocide is a systematically organized event, national elites must present clear goals at 
various stages of the process, namely, preplanning and coordination, execution of violence over 
groups in specified territories, and the expulsion phase through ethnic cleansing and mass killing.
Local elites are important because they can identify the out-group members living in villages, 
cities, and various other localities that national elites have identified for execution.35 Local elites 
are also important because their participation is crucial, especially since they often live in the same 
territory as members of the out-group. To participate in the violence, local elites must effectively 
gather information on members of the group by identifying important community members – 
academics, business leaders, medical professionals, politicians, and religious figures – that must 
be eliminated. By eliminating leaders of the community, the consciousness of the out-group is 
depleted. Moreover, local elites need to identify whether members of the out-group have attempted 
to flee or gone into hiding in nearby villages. Because local elites are familiar with their specified 
localities, the ability to capture and place members of the out-group into concentration camps is 
very useful before ultimately deciding whether to forcibly remove or kill them. Lastly, local elites 
are tasked with national policies, but their responsibility to execute these policies may vary as 
they see appropriate for their localities. Thus, genocide requires the persistent interaction between 
agents at different levels of the state. Agent collaboration also accounts for the overemphasis on 
the national level as seen in previous studies. National elites are crucial to understanding genocide, 
but the dynamic nature of genocide, especially variation in intensity and timing, indicates that a 
greater emphasis must be placed on the local level and local actors.
In sum, my theory is a two-step approach that can be used to account for meso-level dynamics 
of genocide. The previous literature offers important insights into why genocide occurs; however, 
two points are worth noting. First, exclusively, neither has the explanatory power to account 
for the multifaceted nature of genocide. Genocide is far too complicated to be reduced to either 
strategic or ideological arguments. Second, mutually, both contribute to the absence or presence 
of genocide by effectively establishing scope conditions for “at-risk” cases. These scope conditions 
give scholars a realistic universe of cases to examine. By examining these cases, the presence of 
structural control and agent collaboration offers insight into how and why violence escalates and 
radicalizes to genocide. Once elites have political authority, territorial bases, and are coordinating 
their efforts at different levels of the state, then the likelihood of genocide increases. Together, these 
variables establish a feedback loop, whereby agent collaboration helps establish structural control 
and greater structural control incentivizes agents to collaborate. 
illustrates that genocide is highly selective, but also extremely violent and one-sided. Therefore, to achieve such 
extreme violence, actors need to be completely in control.
34 Straus, Retreating from the Brink, 350.
35 Ibid., 351
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Figure 2. Meso-Level Dynamics
Methods, Sources, and Case Selection
I employ a within-case analysis of the municipality of Prijedor. The case study approach is a 
thorough study of a single unit or a small number of units.36 Since my analysis is focused on a 
single-case, I do not have the advantage of randomization afforded to large-n scholars. Instead, 
I rely on the selection procedures available to small-n scholars. I employ what Jack Levy calls 
the Theory-Guided Case Study. This case study “aims to explain and/or interpret a single historical 
episode rather than to generalize beyond the data.”37 Additionally, theory-guided case studies are 
“explicitly structured by a well-developed conceptual framework that focuses attention on some 
theoretically specified aspects of reality and neglects others.”38 
I use both secondary and primary sources, particularly, court documents provided by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The archives are extensive and include 
evidence, testimonies, and judgements from cases over two decades. Furthermore, reports prepared 
by the United Nations Security Council, newspaper clippings, speeches, and secondary sources are 
used to complement the court documents. 
I seek to apply the theoretical insights previously mentioned to a significant, but underexplored 
historical case. This allows for greater in-depth understanding, a key benefit of the qualitative 
approach in the social sciences. In the case study approach, there are nine selection techniques 
identified: typical, diverse, extreme, deviant, influential, crucial, pathway, most-similar, and 
most-different cases. I employ the extreme case selection technique, which identifies cases for 
their extreme value on the independent or dependent variable.39 Within the political violence 
universe, genocide would be an extreme outcome as highlighted by both its intensity and level of 
group-targeting. Relatedly, the positioning of Prijedor in Quadrant C makes it an appropriate and 
important case for investigation.
Prijedor 
Prijedor is a municipality located in northwestern Bosnia in the Bosanska Krajina region. It is 
situated between the town of Sanski Most to the south, the Bosnian-Croatian border towns of 
36 John Gerring, “The Case Study: What It Is and What It Does,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political Science, ed. Robert E. 
Goodin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 7.
37 Jack Levy, “Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 25, no. 1 
(2008), 4, accessed July 30, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1080/07388940701860318.
38 Ibid., 4.
39 John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 89, 101-105. 
One could make the argument that cases could fall into multiple types, but the extreme case is the most relevant for 
this analysis.
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Bosanski Novi to the west and Bosanska Dubica to the north, and the regional capital of Banja 
Luka to the east. Prior to the 1992 referendum – declaring Bosnian independence from Yugoslavia 
– the census of 1991 accounted for a total population of 112,740. The population was ethnically 
intermixed; Bosnian Muslims made up 44 percent of the population, while Bosnian Serbs made 
up 42.5 percent of the population.40 This drastically changed as a result of the Greater Serbia 
campaign. By June 1993, the total population was 65,551. Bosnian Serbs made up 82 percent of the 
total population, while the Bosnian Muslim population was reduced to just under 10 percent.41 
Scope Conditions
Tensions between the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs escalated with the ascension of Radovan 
Karadžić to political power. If Slobodan Milošević was the mastermind behind the Yugoslav Wars, 
then Karadžić can be credited for bringing the Greater Serbia campaign to fruition within Bosnia. 
With a resounding speech to the Bosnian Assembly on October 14, 1991, Karadžić used his political 
grandeur to threaten the Bosnian Muslim goal of independence.
Do not think that you will not lead Bosnia and Herzegovina into hell, and do not think that 
you will not perhaps lead the Muslim people into annihilation, because the Muslims cannot 
defend themselves if there is war – How will you prevent everyone from being killed in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina?42
Karadžić gave a harrowing account of the consequences of possible secession, but he echoed more 
xenophobic sentiments in private in the lead up to the war. Around the time he gave his speech, 
Karadžić also met with Warren Zimmerman, the last Ambassador to Yugoslavia, and blamed the 
“chronic dishonesty” of the Muslims on their leader Izetbegović’s Islamic faith. Stating, “they’re 
prone to oriental despotism. They’re always cheating us. We can’t stand it anymore.” Ambassador 
Zimmerman noted that the most startling takeaway he had from that conversation was Karadžić’s 
portrayal of Izetbegović as a secessionist, even though he was responsible for the creation of a 
Serbian autonomous region prior to any Bosnian secession.43
Following Karadžić’s speech, the Bosnian Parliament passed a resolution on independence 
the following day. Immediately after, the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) discussed the steps needed 
to achieve the “homogenization of Serb people and territories.”44 The top priorities included 
establishing a separate Bosnian Serb Assembly and holding a plebiscite exclusively for Serbs to 
determine whether they wanted to remain in Yugoslavia. By October 24, 1991, the Assembly of the 
Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established, and by January 9, 1992, the Serbs created 
the Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina (later renamed Republika Srpska).45
In Prijedor, the Bosnian Serb leadership established local measures by effectively creating 
parallel governing institutions. This signaled that the Bosnian Serb leadership was not supportive 
of the Bosnian independence movement, and therefore, on January 17, 1992, the newly established 
Prijedor Serb Assembly unanimously voted to join the greater Serbian Autonomous Oblast of 
Bosanska Krajina (ARK).46 Following the declaration of Bosnian independence on March 1, 1992, 
three crucial factors made Prijedor an “at-risk” case.
40 Zavod Za Statistiku Bosne I Hercegovina, Ethnic Composition of Bosnia-Herzegovina Population by Municipality ad 
Settlements, 1991. Census, Bilten no. 234 (Sarajevo, 1991), accessed March 27, 2019, http://josip.purger.com/other/bih/
index.htm. 
41 UNSC, Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 
780, December 28, 1994 (UN Doc: S/1994/674/Annex V, The Prijedor Report), 7.
42 Radovan Karadžić, “Speech to the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” (speech, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
October 14, 1991), accessed February 1, 2019, http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/documents/KaradzicSpeech101591.
pdf. 
43 Warren Zimmerman, Origins of Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers (New York: Time Books, 1999), 175.
44 Bećirević, Genocide on the Drina River, 57.
45 Ibid., 58-61.
46 Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Judgement, July 31, 2003, IT-97-24-T, para. 62.
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First, the Croatian War was a precursor for the type of violence that would unfold in Bosnia. 
The Yugoslavia National Army (JNA) needed conscripts, but many Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian 
Croats chose not to respond to the call in the neighboring country. This created a situation where 
most of the national Yugoslav military was composed of soldiers of Bosnian Serb descent, creating 
insecurity among the non-Serb population of Prijedor.47 Second, a rise in propaganda produced fear 
among the non-Serb community. Radio and TV broadcasts blocked content coming in from Croatia 
and Sarajevo, and only permitted broadcasts from Serbia or the Bosnian Serb hub of Banja Luka. 
At the direction of the Bosnian Serb leadership, Radio Prijedor accused Bosnian Muslim doctors 
of seeking to reduce the Bosnian Serb birth rate by either sterilizing women or giving pregnant 
women “special injections” so they would be limited to only giving birth to girls. Relatedly, 
Bosnian Serb citizens were encouraged to accept a policy of discrimination and exclusion against 
their non-Serb neighbors or fear the consequence of being labeled “traitors.”48 Third, by the time 
war erupted in the cosmopolitan capital of Sarajevo on April 6, 1992, the JNA, now predominately 
Serb, deployed nearly 55,000 troops to Bosnia.49 Around the same time, the Bosnian Serbs ramped 
up their offensive in strategic locations across eastern Bosnia, including Bijeljina, Bratunac, Foča, 
and Zvornik. War officially commenced in Bosnia, and the stage was set for the violence that would 
follow in Prijedor a few weeks later. 
Structural Control
The Bosnian Serb leadership took notable steps in establishing overwhelming political authority 
and territorial bases throughout the municipality. Politically, the Bosnian Serbs effectively rivaled 
and ultimately replaced, the original governing institutions with the creation of two bodies: The 
Bosnian Serb Assembly of Prijedor and the Prijedor Crisis Staff.
The Bosnian Serb Assembly of Prijedor was the local equivalent to the declaration of 
Republika Srpska. By forming the Assembly, the local Bosnian Serb leadership joined the greater 
ARK, composed of Bosnian Serb districts throughout northwest Bosnia. These districts were self-
proclaimed and were formed as a response to the Bosnian declaration for independence. With 
the command and structure established nationally – Republika Srpska – and the creation of the 
Assembly in Prijedor, the next steps involved linking the various regions across Bosnia under 
the unified Greater Serbia objectives. To achieve this, the Bosnian Serb leadership set up similar 
institutions called “Crisis Staffs.” Karadžić set guidelines ordering all municipal and regional 
committees of the SDS to work undercover in preparation for possible war. The Crisis Staffs were 
ordered to cooperate with the commanders of the JNA, members of the SDS, and the Assembly 
of the Bosnian Serbs in each locality. According to expert testimony, “the Crisis Staff coordinates 
functions of authorities with the objective of defending the territory, securing the safety [of people 
and property], establishing the authority and organizing areas of life and work…the Crisis Staff is 
obliged to collect information on conditions in the field.”50 
Territorially, the Bosnian Serbs outpowered the Bosnian Muslims in Prijedor in three ways: 
through the “ethnicization” of the JNA, the arming of Bosnian Serb residents, and the formation of 
territorial headquarters for Bosnian Serb operations in Banja Luka.
Nationally, the JNA was relatively multiethnic and composed of soldiers from the various 
republics prior to 1991. But, by March 1992, except for a minority of Montenegrin soldiers, the 
army was 90 percent Serb.51 With the federal army in complete control by the Bosnian Serbs, the 
JNA began to disarm Bosnian troops and argued that peace and stability could only be secured 
by handing over weapons. Locally, efforts were then made by the JNA to distribute weapons 
47 Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Judgement, March 24, 2016, IT-95-5/18, para. 1582.
48 Ibid. 
49 Zimmerman, Origins of Catastrophe, 185-186; John F. Burns, “Understanding and Letting Loose: Historical Hatreds 
in the Balkans,” New York Times, May 17, 1992, accessed March 25, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/17/
weekinreview/conversations-radovan-karadzic-understanding-letting-loose-historic-hatreds.html. 
50 Bećirević, Genocide on the Drina River, 10.
51 Ibid., 73.
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to the Prijedor Territorial Defense units and the Bosnian Serb citizens.52 Their Bosnian Muslim 
counterparts received outdated weapons often containing the wrong ammunition, whereas 
Bosnian Serb residents were equipped by JNA military helicopters that would land several times 
a day in Serb-concentrated villages of Prijedor. Insofar as weapons were concerned, “only four 
percent of the Muslims in Prijedor have been licensed to have weapons. Many Muslim and Croats 
had their applications for a license to carry turned down without any reason given.”53 The pretext 
for weapons distribution was that it was a necessary defense against the “enemies of the people” 
or the Muslim extremists and the Croatian fascists – Ustaša.54 The weapon distribution phase 
gave Bosnian Serbs two territorial advantages locally. First, it was coupled with the establishment 
of checkpoints, which were vital for Bosnian Serb efforts seeking to control the movement 
of the Bosnian Muslim population in Prijedor. Second, Prijedor had now contained the largest 
concentration of former JNA weapons and the JNA was conducting training programs for Bosnian 
Serb residents throughout the municipality.55 Most significantly, the Bosnian Serbs established 
their territorial headquarters in Banja Luka – only 55 kilometers east of Prijedor. The region had 
a well-organized chain of command, and because of the war in Croatia and the proximity to the 
border, many soldiers were already situated in Banja Luka and ready for the offensive in Prijedor.56
Agent Collaboration
Structural control incentivized agent collaboration in the Prijedor municipality, whereby elites at 
various levels of the state pooled their efforts for the Greater Serbia objectives. At the same time, 
the ability of elites to collaborate helped establish structural control. This feedback loop is evident 
when analyzing the actions of Karadžić. 
Karadžić was crucial in various stages. During stage one, or the propaganda and nationalist 
rhetoric stage, he was the catalyst for a Bosnian Serb state in a time of deep divide and increasing 
ethnic tensions. He founded the SDS in Bosnia in 1989 and unified the Bosnian Serb population 
in the face of Bosnian secession from Yugoslavia. His rhetoric was stern, signaling to the Bosnian 
Muslims that their efforts would lead to bloodshed, disappearance, and ultimately extinction.57 All 
this propelled him to the helm as the first President of Republika Srpska. During stage two, the 
preplanning and coordination phase, Karadžić assured that the formation of the Crisis Staffs was 
executed across the country and that these Crisis Staffs coordinate their efforts with the local civilian 
leadership and military units. During stage three, the execution of the Greater Serbia campaign, 
Karadžić, along with members of the Bosnian Serb leadership, operated under commander’s intent, 
best summed up as
it is unlikely that Milošević or Karadžić could or need have known about or controlled the 
details of all operations. Although in some instances direct guidance on what to do was not 
available, in many cases, ‘commander’s intent’ was more likely used, whereby the leadership 
could set certain policy goals and assume that subordinates would have the latitude to use 
virtually any means to achieve them. Subsequent claims by the Serbian and Bosnian Serbian 
leadership, that they had no control, seem to have been intended primarily to provide 
convenient plausible denial to the outside world without hampering their policy.58
52 Territorial Defense Units were a separate part of the military dating back to the time of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. These forces were set up as a “home guard,” or the equivalent of reserve forces. In Prijedor, much like 
everywhere else, these units were composed of Bosnian Serbs, but some Bosnian Muslim also had their own TO units.
53 UNSC, Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 
780, December 28, 1994 (UN Doc: S/1994/674/Annex V, The Prijedor Report), 25.
54 Ibid., 30.
55 Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Judgement, March 24, 2016, IT-95-5/18, para. 1583.
56 UNSC, Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 
780, December 28, 1994 (UN Doc: S/1994/674/Annex V, The Prijedor Report), 26-27.
57 Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Appeals Chamber Judgement, July 11, 2013, IT-95-5/18-AR98bis.1, para. 98.
58 Norman Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1995), 
48.
Visions of Greater Serbia: Local Dynamics and the Prijedor Genocide
©2020     Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, no. 1  https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.1.1686
117
With Karadžić at the top of the hierarchal structure, it was the responsibility of local leadership to 
carry out the command, and in Prijedor this was achieved by the Crisis Staff, Bosnian Serb police, 
JNA units, and participation of paramilitary groups. According to UN Reports, efforts by the 
JNA and various paramilitary units were “fully synchronized…all the major Serbian operations 
started with heavy artillery barrages or the use of tanks as operated by the regular army, and were 
immediately followed by the onslaught of paramilitary and irregular units working in tandem 
with regular army infantry.” Moreover, the UN investigators concluded that “there is not one 
single report to the effect that there was ever a paramilitary or irregular unit working to obstruct or 
even slightly hinder the objectives of the regular army.”59 
This was made possible due to the highly organized efforts of the Crisis Staffs. In Prijedor, 
the Crisis Staff established control over the municipality by arming local Bosnian Serbs, blocking 
communications of non-Serbs, destroying multiethnic relations throughout the community by 
spreading propaganda, and providing logistical support to the military through the takeover of 
industry and production units.60 
Most importantly, the Crisis Staff implemented the takeover of Prijedor on April 30, 1992. 
Along with brigades from the JNA forces stationed in Banja Luka and members of the Bosnian 
Serb police, the Crisis Staff initiated a coup d’état with little to no resistance. By early morning, 
the Bosnian Serb soldiers established complete control over the Municipal Assembly building, the 
police station, courthouse, bank, post office, and radio station. That same day, Bosnian flags were 
removed from all municipal buildings and replaced with Serbian flags. Non-Serb policemen were 
disarmed and asked to pledge loyalty to secure their employment or face termination.61 
In the weeks following the takeover, the Crisis Staff, JNA, and paramilitary units increased 
exclusivist measures against Bosnian Muslims and other non-Serbs by firing them from work, 
prohibiting children from attending school, and restricting the freedom of movement throughout 
the municipality. These measures extended to the local media too, specifically Radio Prijedor and 
the local newspaper Kozarski Vjesnik. Both served as vehicles of propaganda for the new Bosnian 
Serb leadership. Radio Prijedor broadcasted Serbian nationalist or Četnik songs, attacked members 
of the Party of Democratic Action (the Bosnian Muslim political party), and issued statements 
comparing Bosnian Muslims to Islamic fundamentalists who were seeking to establish control in 
the area to wage genocide against Bosnian Serb citizens.62 
The most haunting measure came on May 30, when Radio Prijedor demanded that all Bosnian 
Muslims and other non-Serbs mark their homes with white flags and themselves with white 
armbands; a sign of surrender.63 It was the first time since 1939 – when the Nazis ordered Polish 
Jews to wear the Star of David on their sleeve – that individuals of an ethnic or religious group 
were marked for mass deportation and mass killing. With overwhelming structural control, and 
coordination at all levels of the state, the Bosnian Serb leadership escalated their offensive that day. 
Some of these individuals were taken to notorious concentration camps like Keraterm, Omarska, and 
Trnopolje, while the remaining victims were subject to harassment and beatings. The beginning of 
the Greater Serbia campaign in Prijedor was underway. 
Genocide
Prijedor, along with other strategic municipalities extending across eastern and northwestern 
Bosnia, was part of the Serbian Arc. The goals were twofold. From a political standpoint, the 
objective was to unite Serbs living in Serbia, Bosnia, and Croatia under a common government. 
59 UNSC, Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 
780, December 28, 1994 (UN Doc: S/1994/674/Annex V, The Prijedor Report), 63-64.
60 Human Rights Watch, The Unindicted: Reaping the Rewards of “Ethnic Cleansing” in Prijedor, January 1, 1997, 14, accessed 
March 25, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/report/1997/01/01/unindicted/reaping-rewards-ethnic-cleansing-prijedor.
61 Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Judgement, July 31, 2003, IT-97-24-T, paras. 76-82; Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Judgement, 
March 14, 2016, IT-95/18-T, paras. 1592-1593; 1597.
62 UNSC, Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 
780, December 28, 1994 (UN Doc: S/1994/674/Annex V, The Prijedor Report), 9.
63 Ibid., 63-64.
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From a territorial standpoint, this would be achieved by physically linking territories throughout 
Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia into a common region; Greater Serbia. Hence, resembling an arc shape. 
These two strategic goals were part of six goals emphasized by Karadžić at the 16th session of the 
Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The first goal is separation from the other two national communities – separation of states. 
Separation from those who are our enemies and who have used every opportunity, especially 
in this century, to attack us, and who would continue with such practices if we were to 
continue to stay together in the same state.
The second strategic goal…is a corridor between Semberija and Krajina. That is something 
for which we may be forced to sacrifice something here and there, but is of the utmost 
importance for the Serbian people, because it integrates the Serbian lands…which will 
integrate us, which will provide us unimpeded flow from one part of our state to another.64
Greater Serbia represented the so-called utopia, or at least the desire to purify what is historically 
and rightfully Serbian from threatening enemies; Bosnian Muslims and other non-Serbs. This 
exclusionary, irredentist ideology was the goal in Prijedor, but to achieve it, the Bosnian Serbs had 
to go beyond the traditional theater of warfare. This required the Bosnian Serbs to enter the group-
selective and group-destructive phase of genocide. 
The process to genocide escalated after the takeover of Prijedor and the subsequent exclusionary 
targeting of Bosnian Muslims and other non-Serb residents. Once the Bosnian Serbs were able 
to disrupt everyday life, without any means of an effective counter-resistance, they shifted their 
efforts to the surrounding villages and the creation of concentration camps.
The Bosnian Serb leadership attacked the predominantly Bosnian Muslim village of Hambarine 
on May 22. An ultimatum was issued over Radio Prijedor ordering several individuals to surrender 
themselves and all their weapons or face possible consequences. The ultimatum was not met, and 
the attack commenced the next day. The units responsible for the attack included the 1st Krajina 
Corps, the 6th Krajina Brigade, the 43rd Motorized Brigade, the Bosnian Serb police, and members 
from various paramilitary groups under the direction of the Crisis Staff.65 Following the attack 
on Hambarine, similar events unfolded in the town of Kozarac – encompassing the villages of 
Kamičani, Kozaruša, Sušići, Brdjani, and Babići. The Bosnian Serb leadership issued an ultimatum 
for weapons surrender and soon thereafter, an attack was initiated consisting of approximately 
5,000 perpetrators. Among the group of perpetrators were the infamous paramilitary units led by 
Željko Ražnatović (Arkan) and Vojislav Šešelj.66
The attack on Kozarac lasted until May 26 and the Bosnian Serbs achieved their ethnic 
purification of the mostly Bosnian Muslim enclave of 25,000 residents. On that same day, Bosnian 
Serb aggressors moved their tanks and loudspeakers into town and began crying out, “Muslims 
get out! Muslims get out! Surrender and everyone will be safe!” Homes were destroyed, some even 
set on fire with residents still in them, and Bosnian Muslims agreed to terms of surrender: If they 
wished to evacuate Kozarac and accept surrender, they would need to form a column. What they did 
not know at that time was that they were being subjected to a “carefully planned and coordinated 
attack designed not only to remove the population, but to liquidate its leaders and destroy homes 
so that the ‘cleansing’ would be irreversible.”67 Thousands of Bosnian Muslims emerged from the 
64 Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Judgement, March 14, 2016, IT-95/18-T, para. 2857.
65 Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Judgement, July 31, 2003, IT-97-24-T, paras. 131-136; Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin, 
Judgement, September 1, 2004, IT-99-36-T, para. 626.
66 Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Judgement, March 14, 2016, IT-95/18-T, para. 1619; Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin, 
Judgement, September 1, 2004, IT-99-36-T, para. 627; Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Judgement, July 31, 2003, IT-97-24-T, 
para. 142. Arkan was a Serbian career criminal, wanted by INTERPOL throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and indicted 
for crimes against humanity during the Yugoslav Wars.
67 Mary Battiata, “A Town’s Bloody Cleansing,” Washington Post, November 2, 1992, accessed March 27, 2019, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/11/02/a-towns-bloody-cleansing/3c5bbcee-7c9c-4669-82b7-bcec86c01237/. 
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forest waving white flags of surrender. Additionally, the town’s elite was identified, including 
judges, politicians, police officers, restaurant owners, factory managers, and local sports heroes, for 
removal and transportation to the established concentration camps. 
Whether in Hambarine, Kozarac, Prijedor proper, or other Bosnian Muslim enclaves, the 
same pattern unfolded in late May and early June. The men were brought to concentration camps 
to be detained, and in many cases, tortured and killed. The women, children, and elderly men 
were transported to Trnopolje, for immediate deportation or prolonged captivity. To sum up, “In 
Prijedor town, Stari Grad [Old Town] and adjacent areas were ‘ethnically cleansed’ first, that is 
already on May 30, 1992. Other parts of the town were ‘cleansed’ in raids or in connection with 
ransacking the following days.”68 By this point, the Bosnian Serb leadership moved onto the last 
phase of the Greater Serbia objectives – mass deportation and mass killing. The former was largely 
the responsibility of the camp at Trnopolje, while camps Keraterm and Omarska were primarily used 
for detention, subjugation, expulsion, and in extreme cases, death.
The detainees at Keraterm and Omarska were subject to serious mistreatment and abuse, 
including lack of food and medical care, poor hygiene and overcrowding, physical abuse and 
interrogations, and death. Both camps were established by the Crisis Staff and were under the 
command of the Bosnian Serb military and police officers. Although records at Omarska were 
inadequate, estimates indicated that around 700 people were killed.69 The camp was eventually 
shut down on August 7, following a visit from international journalist Roy Gutman. Gutman was 
the first to break the story by reporting on the maltreatment and killings of detainees. Following 
Gutman’s reporting, Ed Vulliamy, a British journalist, described what he saw at Omarska.
The men are at various stages of human decay and affliction; the bones of their elbows and 
wrists protrude like pieces of jagged stone from the pencil thin stalks to which their arms 
have been reduced…There is nothing quite like the sight of the prisoner desperate to talk 
and to convey some terrible truth that is so near yet so far, but who dares not. Their stares 
burn, they speak only with their terrified silence, and eyes inflamed with the articulation of 
stark, undiluted, desolate fear-without-hope.70
Keraterm was reported to have held as many as 1,500 detainees at any given time, primarily in 
four separate rooms. Keraterm was also the site of the July 24 massacres.  Leading up to the event, 
detainees originally in Room 3 were moved to Rooms 2 and 4, clearing the room for Bosnian Muslim 
men who arrived from the Brdo area on July 20 or 21. Other witnesses indicated that the detainees 
were stripped of their documents and forbidden from interacting with detainees in other rooms.71 
On the night of July 24, Armed guards entered the camp and placed a machine-gun on top of the 
table facing Room 3, resulting in the massacre of nearly 200 Bosnian Muslim men.72 According to 
a Bosnian Muslim witness, he was in Room 2 when the massacre had occurred, and the following 
day, several survivors at the camp were instructed to pile dead and wounded bodies into a truck 
that was never seen again.73 
68 UNSC, Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 
780, December 28, 1994 (UN Doc: S/1994/674/Annex V, The Prijedor Report), 58.
69 Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide: The First Inside Account of the Horrors of Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia (Boston: Element 
Books, 1993), 91-92. Gutman’s numbers indicated between 1,200 to 2,000, but more recent and accurate estimations are 
closer to 700. See Albina Sorguc, “Bosnians Commemorate Victims of Notorious Omarska Camp,” Balkan Transnational 
Justice, August 6, 2018, accessed February 12, 2020, https://balkaninsight.com/2018/08/06/bosnians-commemorate-
victims-of-notorious-omarska-camp-08-06-2018/.
70 Ed Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnian’s War (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 102.
71 Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Judgement, March 14, 2016, IT-95/18-T, para. 1807.
72 Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Judgment, July 21, 2003, IT-97-24-T, paras. 204-206.
73 Joseph R. Biden, Jr., To Stand Against Aggression: Milosevic, the Bosnian Republic, and the Conscience of the West: A Report 
to the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1993), 47; UNSC, The Final 
Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, December 28, 1994 (UN Doc. 
S/1994/674/Annex VIII, Prison Camps), 226. It is reported that detainees in Room 3 were given the worst treatment, 
including torture and killings.
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As for Trnopolje, it was initially established for the mass deportation of women, children, 
and the elderly. But, after the closing of Keraterm and Omarska, Bosnian Muslim men were also 
transferred to the camp. Conditions improved slightly in late August due to the international 
outcry, but the situation as a whole remained dire. For example, on August 21, some detainees 
were even subject to mass killing. A convoy stopped at Trnopolje, where mostly male detainees 
but also some women and children were loaded on for transfer. As the convoy made its way to 
the town of Skender Vakuf, men of military age were separated from the women and children and 
ordered to get on two empty buses. The buses, which included some 250 detainees, stopped at a 
nearby cliff facing a deep gorge. It was reported that approximately 200 dead bodies were found 
near Mount Vlašić after the August 21 massacre.74  
Conclusion
By the end 1992, the goals of genocide had been achieved due to the effective deportation and 
extermination of Bosnian Muslims and non-Serbs. By June 1993, the Bosnian Muslim population 
accounted for just under 10 percent of the total population in Prijedor. By 1995, this number was 
down to 5 percent, a drastic demographic change when compared to 44 percent in 1991.75 As 
the international community was fixated on the events occurring in Sarajevo, the Bosnian Serb 
leadership effectively established dominance in strategic territory for purposes of securing a 
homogenous Serb population. What occurred in the Prijedor municipality over the spring and 
summer of 1992 can best be characterized as the following:
The ‘ethnic cleansing’ is the core of the Serbian military operations in Bosnia. It may even be 
argued, as some observers do, that the events in Sarajevo – where there is a more traditional 
theatre of war with all its horrors – are staged, in part at least, to take away international 
attention from the eradication of entire ethnic groups in areas where there has not even been 
any real war, only tremendous abuses of military power – such as in Opstina Prijedor.76
By focusing on the meso-level, a more in-depth understanding of Prijedor was elucidated. 
Particularly, the presence of structural control and agent collaboration were crucial for explaining 
the events that unfolded in Prijedor. War and exclusivist ideology created a hostile situation. After 
the siege of Sarajevo and the onset of violence in eastern Bosnia, it was only a matter of time until 
violence reached Prijedor. But these were scope conditions, or “at-risk” factors. To account for 
the escalation and radicalization of violence to genocide, the following variables were necessary: 
overwhelming political authority, territorial presence, and a highly coordinated effort between 
national and local elites. These factors brought the Greater Serbia goals to life, an accounted for the 
high-level of intensity and group-targeting witnessed in Prijedor. Moving forward, two questions 
remain: Were these same patterns present across other municipalities of the Serbian arc? And if 
so, what municipalities were able to overcome or avoid genocide and why? These questions are 
a logical next step I plan to unpack in future studies to account for cross-case comparisons at the 
subnational level. 
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